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GENE PATENTS, DRUG PRICES, AND 
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: UNEXPECTED 




Recently, Congress has considered legislation to amend § 101, a section of 
the Patent Act that the Supreme Court has held to prohibit patenting of laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. This draft legislation would 
expand the realm of patent-eligible subject matter, overturning the Court’s 
precedents along the way. The draft legislation, and movement to change this 
doctrine of patent law, made substantial headway with a subcommittee of the 
Senate holding numerous roundtables and hearings on the subject. 
This article considers some less-discussed consequences of that draft leg-
islative proposal. The legislation likely opens the door to patenting of subject 
matter such as human genes and scientific discoveries, given its broad lan-
guage and abrogation of precedent. Allowing such patents would have conse-
quential effects such as potentially raising drug prices, decreasing quality of 
health care, deterring scientific research, slowing the development of innova-
tive technologies, and conflicting with scientific and ethical norms. 
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Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on June 4, 2019, and also an article originally 
published in Slate: Future Tense. See The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (June 4, 2019) (tes-
timony of Charles Duan), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Duan%20Testimony.pdf; 
Charles Duan, A Century-Old Debate over Science Patents Is Repeating Itself Today, SLATE (Feb. 25, 
2019), https://slate.com/technology/2019/02/patenting-nature-francesco-ruffini-history-tillis-coons.
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Considerations such as these ought to be top-of-mind for legislators intending 
to change the law of patentable subject matter eligibility. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
It was 1923, and Francesco Ruffini was going to rescue science. The Italian 
senator’s plan was simple: Give scientists an ownership stake in their discov-
eries—a sort of patent on the laws of nature they discovered. He had written a 
compelling and widely praised report and proposal, he had the backing of the 
newly formed League of Nations, and he had the support of prominent scientific 
and legal experts. But within a few years, Ruffini’s grand plan would fall apart. 
Scientists around the world rejected the plan, and lawmakers shelved it. 
Ruffini’s committee on the League of Nations, the Committee on Intellectual 
Cooperation, would come to be remembered by one member, Albert Einstein, 
as “the most ineffectual enterprise with which I have been associated.”1 
Now, Ruffini may have the last laugh. Despite decades—arguably centu-
ries—of law prohibiting patents on “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
 
1. Stanley W. Pycior, Marie Skłodowska Curie and Albert Einstein: A Professional and Per-
sonal Relationship, 44 POLISH REV. 131, 141 (1999). For references and authorities for this paragraph, 
see Section III.A infra notes 27–60. 
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abstract ideas,”2 there has been recent interest in expanding the realm of patents 
in ways that may allow for patents on the scientific discoveries that Ruffini 
hoped to protect. In particular, in response to several recent Supreme Court de-
cisions on patentable subject matter eligibility,3 there have been numerous calls 
for Congress to revise 35 U.S.C. § 101, the statutory basis for these limits on 
patent eligibility.4 Congress has listened: Across the first half of 2019, the In-
tellectual Property Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee first held 
a series of private roundtables to discuss potential legislation,5 then produced 
“draft bill text” to amend § 101,6 and then held three days of hearings in June 
with forty-five witnesses testifying on the state of patent eligibility law.7 
By rendering an entire body of Supreme Court and other judicial precedent 
“hereby abrogated”8 among other things, the proposed legislation will undoubt-
edly have widespread and unexpected implications. This article identifies sev-
eral, specifically directed to concerns about patents and scientific discoveries. 
Section II reviews the draft legislation and considers its effects with respect 
to the perspectives of medicines and science.9 In particular, by abrogating prec-
edent that conclusively rejected patenting of laws of nature and natural phe-
nomena, the draft legislation reopens the door to patenting of scientific discov-
eries and human genes among other things. In other words, the legislation 
 
2. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); see O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 119–20 
(1853); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS 
L.J. 53, 63–69 (2011) (describing pre-O’Reilly doctrines of eligibility). 
3. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 212 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 579 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prome-
theus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
4. See, e.g., David O. Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2149, 2152 
(2017); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Final Report of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Section 101 
Workshop: Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 551, 592–600 (2018); 
AIPLA, AIPLA LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL AND REPORT ON PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER 
(2017), https://web.archive.org/web/20180305202953/https:/www.aipla.org/resources2/reports/
2017AIPLADirect/Documents/AIPLA%20Report%20on%20101%20Reform-5-19-17-Errata.pdf; 
Letter from Donna P. Suchy, Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Intellectual Prop. Law, to Michelle K. Lee, 
Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop. & Dir. of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Request 
for Comments Related to Patent Subject Matter Eligibility (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/RT2%20Comments%20ABA-IPL.pdf. 
5. See Malathi Nayak, Tillis, Coons Vet Patent Eligibility Bill Principles with Stakeholders, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 26, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/tillis-coons-vet-patent-eligi-
bility-bill-principles-with-stakeholders. 
6. Press Release, Sens. Tillis and Coons and Reps. Collins, Johnson, and Stivers Release Draft 
Bill Text to Reform Section 101 of the Patent Act (May 22, 2019) [hereinafter Draft § 101 Text], https://
www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/5/sens-tillis-and-coons-and-reps-collins-johnson-and-stivers-release-
draft-bill-text-to-reform-section-101-of-the-patent-act. 
7. See id. (announcing hearings). 
8. Id. (additional legislative provisions, second bullet). 
9. See infra Section II. 
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would reach much the same result that Ruffini’s proposal in the 1920s had 
hoped to accomplish. 
The remainder of the article considers the effects of opening up the possi-
bility of patenting scientific discoveries, human genes, and other analogous 
laws and products of nature. Section III discusses how the draft legislation 
could inhibit scientific research by enabling patents that essentially cover those 
laws of nature that are the foundation of scientific progress.10 After reviewing 
the historical parallels between the present legislative proposal and Senator 
Ruffini’s proposal of the 1920s, the section will consider contemporary per-
spectives of scientists in the genetic research and similar fields, who generally 
find that patents on scientific discoveries would interfere with downstream re-
search while failing to provide any concomitant incentive to scientific research. 
Section IV discusses the likelihood that the draft legislation will raise drug 
prices at a time when soaring costs of health care are a top priority for American 
voters.11 More concerningly, there is historical reason to believe that expanding 
patent eligibility in this way may reduce access to lifesaving medical treat-
ments, thereby resulting in American health care being lower in quality and 
diminished in safety compared to that of other nations. 
Section V extends the previous two arguments by considering the effect of 
draft legislation on innovation, particularly in the health care and life science 
industries.12 An important lesson from the last few decades is that the inventors 
of genetic testing and medical diagnostic technologies have recognized that pa-
tents on laws and products of nature frequently stymie their work. Those same 
inventors have further said that patents are not a necessary incentive for their 
work, and economic data supports their claims. Indeed, several past experiences 
show that expansive patents on products of nature actually discouraged further 
innovation even by the patent owner, instead leading to destructive races that 
soured collaboration and progress in science. 
Finally, Section VI discusses ways in which the draft legislation may clash 
with scientific norms, medical ethics, and human rights.13 Patents on scientific 
discoveries draw scientists away from contributing to the public store of 
knowledge. Patents on diagnostic test results force medical professionals to 
choose between infringing patents and giving their patients potentially lifesav-
ing information. And patents on human genes distort notions of bodily integrity 
and rights of self-determination. 
 
10. See infra Section III. 
11. See infra Section IV. 
12. See infra Section V. 
13. See infra Section VI. 
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Though the draft legislation on the table exhibits the many issues discussed 
above, it is not the only possible alternative. Section VII reviews a number of 
other pathways forward with regard to legislative or policy solutions.14 Some 
involve amendment to § 101, while others involve changes to other aspects of 
the patent laws in tandem. These alternatives, drawn from academic research 
and recent case law, ought to inform any process for going forward with recon-
sideration of patent subject matter eligibility. 
II.  PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF HUMAN GENES, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES, AND 
OTHER NATURAL LAWS AND PHENOMENA 
The draft legislation leaves little room for doubt as to its effect: It will allow 
for the patenting of human genes, diagnostic test results, and a wide range of 
scientific discoveries of the laws of nature.15 
The legislative proposal explicitly eliminates the three historic categories 
of ineligible subject matter for patenting, notably including laws of nature and 
natural phenomena.16 It further abrogates all existing judicial precedent pertain-
ing thereto, including Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
Inc.,17 which prohibited the patenting of human or other naturally occurring 
gene sequences; Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc.,18 which prohibited the patenting of natural correlations between diagnostic 
tests and treatment adjustments; Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,19 
which prohibited the patenting of naturally occurring bacteria; and Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty,20 which recognized the “relevant distinction” for patent eligibility 
purposes “between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made 
inventions.”21 
 
14. See infra Section VII. 
15. The Senate proponents and the supporters of the legislative text repeatedly disputed this 
claim during the hearings, arguing that the “proposal would not change the law to allow a company to 
patent a gene as it exists in the human body.” Kelly Servick, Controversial U.S. Bill Would Lift Su-
preme Court Ban on Patenting Human Genes, SCIENCE (June 4, 2019), https://www.sciencemag.org/
news/2019/06/controversial-us-bill-would-lift-supreme-court-ban-patenting-human-genes (quoting 
Sen. Coons). Yet, as discussed below, the controversy over patenting of genes has consistently been 
whether isolation outside the body is sufficient to confer patent eligibility, see Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 580 (2013); the careful wording “as it exists in the 
human body” cleverly sidesteps the question of whether the draft legislation undoes the prohibition on 
patenting isolated genes. 
16. See Draft § 101 Text, supra note 6 (additional legislative provisions, second bullet). 
17. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 580. 
18. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012). 
19. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
20. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980). 
21. Id. 
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Furthermore, the draft legislation enshrines into law the primary argument 
that the Supreme Court considered and rejected in Myriad when considering 
the patent eligibility of human gene sequences. Myriad Genetics, the patent 
owner, contended that the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes at issue in the case were 
not products of nature because they had been isolated from the rest of the ge-
nome, and thus were the product of human intervention rather than nature; the 
Supreme Court rejected this argument.22 By contrast, the draft legislation pro-
vides that patent eligibility inheres in any “invention or discovery” that arises 
“through human intervention.”23 The draft legislation thus, by its plain lan-
guage, undoes the exact argument that the Supreme Court relied on to reject the 
patenting of human genes. 
The draft legislation further eliminates barriers to patenting scientific dis-
coveries of principles of nature. Besides explicitly abrogating the “laws of na-
ture” exception to patent eligibility, the draft provides that patent eligibility is 
to be determined “without discounting or disregarding any claim limitation.”24 
Any competent patent attorney can include a conventional step of receiving 
information or a test sample prior to reciting a natural law to which the infor-
mation or test sample is to be applied.25 That would apparently render the nat-
ural law patent-eligible, despite the fact that there would be no practical change 
to who would infringe the patent. 
Accordingly, the draft legislation evinces no limits that would prevent the 
patenting of human genes or scientific discoveries. If this legislation were en-
acted, it must be assumed that such patents would issue in due course. 
III.  EFFECTS FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
It has long been recognized that patents on the laws and products of nature 
can stifle important scientific research. As the Supreme Court explained in 
Funk Bros., natural laws and phenomena, “like the heat of the sun, electricity, 
or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge” and as such 
are “free to all men [and women] and reserved exclusively to none.”26 By ab-
rogating this decision among others, the draft legislation is thus to the detriment 
of the storehouse of knowledge and to the detriment of the progress of science 
that the storehouse of knowledge may beget. 
 
22. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 593. 
23. Draft § 101 Text, supra note 6, § 100(k). 
24. Id. § 101(b). 
25. Cf. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (“A competent draftsman could attach some 
form of post-solution activity to almost any mathematical formula . . . .”). 
26. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
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History and experience prove what theory suggests: Patents on human 
genes—products of nature—have forestalled research into genetics, and patents 
on diagnostics—laws of nature—have forestalled research in other fields. Inso-
far as basic research has been foundational to innumerable advances in science 
and technology, the possibility that the patent system could interfere with that 
foundation should be of great concern. 
A.  Early-1900s “Scientific Property” Proposals 
The draft legislation on § 101 is remarkably similar to a proposal for a right 
of “scientific property” discussed in the early twentieth century. Review of the 
history of that proposal and its ultimate failure provides helpful context for un-
derstanding the present-day proposal. 
The scientific property proposal was a product of the League of Nations’ 
Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, the predecessor to today’s U.N. Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, commonly known as 
UNESCO.27 The committee—a star-studded affair with members including Al-
bert Einstein, Marie Curie, H.A. Lorentz, and Robert Millikan—had a mission 
of improving the state of science in the wake of the European economic devas-
tation of the First World War.28 The committee would contemplate a variety of 
international topics during its tenure, such as creation of an international uni-
versity, academic exchange programs, and even the adoption of Esperanto as a 
universal language.29 
Francesco Ruffini, an Italian senator who was a member of the committee, 
had another idea for how to increase scientific research.30 His Report on Scien-
tific Property of 1923 contended that a scientist who made a breakthrough 
 
27. See Inventory of the Archives of the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation 
(IICI) 1925–1946, 8–9, UNESCO Doc. UIS.90/WS/1 (June 1990), https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/
48223/pf0000086288 (“La première Conférence générale de l’Unesco en novembre-décembre 1946, 
tenue è Paris, opprouva un accord avec l’IICI, dont l’objet étoit d’assurer, sous la responsabilité de 
l’Unesco, la continuité de l’oeuvre menée depuis 1925 par l’institut. . . . L’Unesco hérite des biens de 
l’Institut comprenant ses archives et publications, qui furent transférées au siège de l’Unesco, Avenue 
Kléber è Paris.” [“The first General Conference of Unesco in November–December 1946, held in 
Paris, approved an agreement with the IICI, the object of which was to ensure, under the responsibility 
of Unesco, the continuity of the work carried out since 1925 by the institute. . . . Unesco inherits the 
property of the Institute including its archives and publications, which were transferred to Unesco 
headquarters, Avenue Kléber in Paris.”]). The IICI, or International Institute of Intellectual Coopera-
tion, was a successor to the Committee on Intellectual Cooperation. See id. at 7–8. See generally Jan 
Stöckmann, 90 Years of Intellectual Cooperation: The Forgotten History of UNESCO’s Predecessor, 
J. HIST. IDEAS BLOG (Oct. 12, 2016), https://jhiblog.org/2016/10/12/90-years-of-intellectual-coopera-
tion-the-forgotten-history-of-unescos-predecessor/. 
28. See Robert A. Millikan, The Interchange of Men of Science, 91 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 
129, 129 (1947). 
29. See id. at 129–32. 
30. See id. at 130. 
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discovery should own the discovery, receiving “scientific property” in the same 
way that artists hold copyrights in their art and inventors get patents on their 
inventions.31 He recognized that this would be an extraordinary reform to intel-
lectual property laws worldwide, which at the time uniformly rejected rights in 
scientific discoveries.32 Nevertheless, he found the inability of scientists to ob-
tain exclusivities in their discoveries to be an “injustice” that his proposal would 
“eliminate.”33 
The Committee on Intellectual Cooperation approved Ruffini’s report and 
proposal, and the full League of Nations Assembly distributed the report to 
member countries for comment.34 Soon thereafter it received substantial praise 
in the United States. Professor John Henry Wigmore of Northwestern Univer-
sity coauthored an article with Ruffini, praising Ruffini’s report as “an admira-
bly comprehensive and practical survey of the problem.”35 The article notes a 
$1000 prize (more than $14,500 today) for an essay on a “speedy solution to 
the problem,” offered by the Charles J. Linthicum Foundation of Northwestern 
University.36 The prize went to C.J. Hamson, whose 1930 book Patent Rights 
for Scientific Discoveries argued that property rights in scientific discoveries 
would “remedy the injustice under which scientists labor,” “secure to science 
the independence which it may properly claim,” and “attract to the study of 
pure science a type of person whose ability is undoubted but who is at present 
deterred by the position of scientists.”37 
Patent lawyers, too, were intrigued by the concept of scientific property.38 
The American Patent Law Association formed a Committee of Scientific Prop-
erty, choosing prominent Chicago lawyer Edward S. Rogers as the committee 
 
31. Comm. on Intellectual Cooperation, League of Nations, Report on Scientific Property, § 2, 
at 2, League of Nations Doc. A.38.1923.XII A (Sept. 1, 1923) (prepared by F. Ruffini), https://www.
scribd.com/document/400469172/Ruffini-Report; see id. § 14, art. 1, at 24 (providing “for the protec-
tion of the rights of authors to their scientific discoveries”). 
32. See id. § 3, at 4–5 (noting “duality of systems” for intellectual property, namely patents and 
copyrights, which leave unprotected a “neutral zone . . . in which scientific work, properly so called, 
is developed”). 
33. Id. § 2, at 4. 
34. See David Philip Miller, Intellectual Property and Narratives of Discovery/Invention: The 
League of Nations’ Draft Convention on “Scientific Property” and its Fate, 46 HIST. SCI. 299, 306 
(2008); Thomas R. Ilosvay, Scientific Property, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 178, 183 (1953). 
35. John H. Wigmore & Francesco Ruffini, Scientific Property, 22 ILL. L. REV. 355, 359 
(1927). Wigmore was a participant at the Committee on Intellectual Cooperation; a memorandum by 
Wigmore was attached as an annex to Ruffini’s report. See id. at 358; League of Nations Doc. 
A.38.1923.XII A, supra note 31, at 26–28. 
36. Wigmore & Ruffini, supra note 35, at 378. 
37. C.J. HAMSON, PATENT RIGHTS FOR SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES 16 (1930). 
38. See generally Miller, supra note 34, at 314–19; Ilosvay, supra note 34, at 190–92. 
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head in 1924.39 Rogers was optimistic about the idea, writing that an intellectual 
property right to “protect discoveries in science is, after all, no more than the 
extension into a broader and somewhat more abstract, but not a different field, 
of the principle of protection already accorded to other inventions.”40 The 
American Bar Association’s Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Section in 1932 
initiated an effort to investigate the subject, convinced the effort would succeed 
to the great benefit of scientists: “When the interest of so many is at stake, the 
protection of that interest is generally capable of accomplishment.”41 
The present-day draft legislation from the Intellectual Property Subcom-
mittee has much in common with Ruffini’s 1920s idea. Like the modern draft 
legislation that responds to Supreme Court precedent limiting patent eligibil-
ity,42 Ruffini and Wigmore viewed the scientific property proposal as a legisla-
tive response to judicial decisions such as Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary 
that prohibited patenting the discovery of ether’s anesthetic properties.43 Both 
limit any exclusive right to practical applications of scientific discoveries rather 
than exclusivity in the discovery itself.44 And two of the key organizations who 
have promoted § 101 reform today, the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association45 and the Patent Section of the American Bar Association,46 are 
remarkably the same two patent organizations that supported Ruffini’s proposal 
above, with subsequent name changes to replace “Patent” with “Intellectual 
Property.”47 
Those similarities suggest that there may be important lessons for the pre-
sent legislative proposal to be learned from Ruffini’s 1923 effort—particularly 
lessons about how that earlier effort failed. Despite initial optimism about 
Ruffini’s idea, discontent quickly arose.48 Rogers, who praised the idea in 1925, 
 
39. See Miller, supra note 34, at 315. 
40. Edward S. Rogers, The Proposal for Scientific Copyright, with the Literary Parallel, 7 J. 
COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 69, 85 (1925). 
41. Richard Spencer, Scientific Property, 18 A.B.A. J. 79, 82 (1932); see also Miller, supra 
note 34, at 316. 
42. See Draft § 101 Text, supra note 6 (additional legislative provisions, second bullet). 
43. See Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F.Cas. 879, 882 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1802) (No. 9,865); 
Wigmore & Ruffini, supra note 35, at 356. 
44. Compare Draft § 101 Text, supra note 6, § 100(k) (requiring “human intervention” for pa-
tentability), with League of Nations Doc. A.38.1923.XII A, supra note 31, § 14, art. 5 (limiting scien-
tific property right to “economic advantages” of “industrial or commercial exploitation of new appli-
cations of [scientists’] discoveries and inventions”). 
45. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 4. 
46. Suchy, supra note 4. 
47. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1031, 1033 n.4 (2005). 
48. See Miller, supra note 34, at 317 (noting how “legal efforts to protect scientific property 
ran out of steam in the U.S. in the 1930s”). 
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ended up advising against it in 1931, saying in a letter to the Department of 
Commerce that the plan “sounds awfully good” but ultimately “the whole 
scheme seems impractical.”49 The Patent Section of the American Bar Associ-
ation would also shelve its plan, after receiving a strongly negative report from 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science.50 The member na-
tion replies to the League of Nations were mixed but included disapprovals 
from the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany, India, Czecho-
slovakia, Yugoslavia, South Africa, and Thailand.51 
The problem with the scientific property proposal of the 1920s was imple-
mentation: Deep thinkers on the subject, even those in favor of scientific prop-
erty in principle, found themselves unable to develop the details of such a right. 
Rogers, for example, wondered how scientific property would deal with multi-
ple contributors to one discovery: “Who, for example, ‘discovered’ electricity? 
Was it Franklin, Ampere, Ohm or the chap that made the Leyden jar?”52 Indus-
tries worried about unexpected liability, leading the Committee on Intellectual 
Cooperation to add into its proposal an “insurance scheme designed to safe-
guard industry interests.”53 A former chief clerk of the U.S. Patent Office ques-
tioned whether scientific property patents could be written without being too 
vague and speculative.54 
Scientists themselves, however, mounted the strongest opposition to the 
proposed scientific property right. The American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science report worried that “the legal and practical difficulties involved 
in enforcing any scientific property would eventually arouse an unfavorable 
public opinion against scientists, owing to the difficulty of enforcing scientific 
property and the inherent nature of its broad monopoly”; it further predicted 
that a scientific property right “would only lead to greater confusion and uncer-
tainty and multiply the complexity of an already complex structure” of patent 
law.55 The report went on to quote other scientific organizations: 
 
49. See Opposes Royalties on Scientific Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1931, at 15. 
50. See Joseph Rossman et al., The Protection by Patents of Scientific Discoveries: Report of 
the Committee on Patents, Copyrights and Trade Marks, 79 SCIENCE supp., 40 (Jan. 1934); Miller, 
supra note 34, at 316. 
51. See Ilosvay, supra note 34, at 184. 
52. Opposes Royalties on Scientific Ideas, supra note 49. 
53. Miller, supra note 34, at 313; see Ilosvay, supra note 34, at 184. 
54. See W[illia]m I. Wyman, Patents for Scientific Discoveries, 11 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 533, 
552–53 (1929) (“A patentable invention . . . must define the inventible contribution so that the limits 
of protection accorded may be legally determined. The scope of a publication of a scientific discovery 
on the contrary and of necessity, cannot be determinable . . . .”). Wyman served as chief clerk until 
1923, whereupon he returned to being a patent examiner for buildings, bridges, and roads. See Change 
in Office of Chief Clerk, 307 Off. Gaz. Pat. Off. 233 (Feb. 13, 1923); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP’T 
OF COMMERCE, OFFICIAL REGISTER OF THE UNITED STATES 98 (1929). 
55. Rossman et al., supra note 50, at 40. 
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• NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL: It is “the almost unanimous opin-
ion of its members that the protection by law of a scientist’s prop-
erty rights to his discoveries is not feasible, and it is of doubtful 
desirability.”56 
• AMERICAN ENGINEERING COUNCIL, in a survey of other organiza-
tions and societies: “The majority of those who have taken action 
are adverse to any plan for protecting discoveries in pure science, 
on the ground that it is not only impractical but unnecessary . . . . 
Seven societies take the view that ‘to extend into pure science re-
search the privilege of patenting a mere scientific fact would enable 
the Patent Office and the courts to go far beyond the points safe for 
engineering and industry.’”57 
The AAAS report concluded that “no effort should at present be made to 
develop a plan for protecting scientific property. There appears to be no need 
for such legal protection from the view-point of incentive to the scientist or 
public policy.”58 
These concerns remain relevant today: Inventions continue to involve mul-
tiple contributors,59 and patents frequently impose on modern industry vague 
and uncertain language, unexpected liability, and costly litigation.60 Any mod-
ifications to § 101 that could enable patents that approach coverage of scientific 
discoveries ought to be considered cautiously in view of this history. 
B.  Deterrence of Downstream Research 
Consistent with this historical experience, recent experience shows that pa-
tents on natural phenomena, in particular patents on human genes, have de-
terred important research. 
The patents at issue in Myriad characterize the research-inhibitory character 
of patents on genes. Prior to its patents being deemed ineligible in 2013,61 Myr-
iad reportedly used its patents on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene markers of 
breast cancer risk, not just to shut down competitor genetic testing services, but 
 
56. Id. at 38. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 40. 
59. See, e.g., Stefan Wagner, Are “Patent Thickets” Smothering Innovation?, YALE INSIGHTS 
(Apr. 22, 2015), https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/are-patent-thickets-smothering-innovation; 
Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 121–22 (2001). 
60. See James Bessen, Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of 
Patent Trolls, REGULATION, Winter 2011–2012, at 26, 28, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/
serials/files/regulation/2012/5/v34n4-1.pdf (discussing lawsuits over patents with “fuzzy boundaries,” 
which cause “the loss of billions of dollars of wealth”). 
61. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 585 (2013). 
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also to stop research. Yale genetic researcher Allen Bale said that he was forced 
to stop a large-scale study on breast cancer because Myriad refused to allow 
him to sequence the BRCA1 gene.62 Though empirical evidence on Myriad’s 
impact on research is sparse, scientists have noted several dramatic cases in 
which researchers reported stopping work because of Myriad’s patents and fur-
ther observed that Myriad’s ambiguous stance on patent enforcement against 
researchers “equates to a chilling effect in zones of uncertainty.”63 
Problems for researchers were not limited to Myriad’s patents. A 2003 sur-
vey of 122 directors of genetic testing laboratories found that 53% of them had 
“decided not to develop or perform a test/service for clinical or research pur-
poses because of a patent.”64 Another study of 119 laboratories found that 30% 
were not testing for a genetic indicator of hemochromatosis at least partly be-
cause of a patent on the relevant gene.65 An economic study found that one 
firm’s intellectual property on certain genes “appears to have generated eco-
nomically and statistically significant reductions in subsequent scientific re-
search and product development, on the order of 20–30 percent.”66 Thus, “what 
the empirical evidence demonstrates is a real fear on behalf of clinical labora-
tory directors and researchers based on the belief that patent holders can and 
will prevent them from conducting their research.”67 
As a result of these negative effects of gene patents on scientific research, 
scientists have vocally opposed such patents. Dr. Francis Collins, director of 
the National Institutes of Health and former director of the National Human 
Genome Research Institute, wrote in 2010 that human genetics “is so funda-
mental, and requires so much further research to understand its utility, that pa-
tenting it at the earliest stage is like putting up a whole lot of unnecessary toll 
 
62. See Kimberly Blanton, Corporate Takeover: Exploiting the US Patent System, a Single 
Company Has Gained Control over Genetic Research and Testing for Breast Cancer. And Scientists, 
Doctors, and Patients Have to Play by Its Rules, BOSTON GLOBE MAG., Feb. 24, 2002, https://web.
archive.org/web/20021014222141/http://www.boston.com:80/globe/magazine/2002/0224_patent_
part1.htm. 
63. Robert Cook-Deegan et al., Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing Practices on Access to 
Genetic Testing for Inherited Susceptibility to Cancer: Comparing Breast and Ovarian Cancers with 
Colon Cancers, 12 GENETICS MED. S15, S28 (2010). 
64. Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical Genetic 
Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 5 (2003). 
65. See Jon F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test: The Pitfalls of Patents Are Illus-
trated by the Case of Haemochromatosis, 415 NATURE 577, 577 (2002). 
66. Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human 
Genome, 121 J. POL. ECON. 1, 4 (2013). 
67. E. Richard Gold & Julia Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy Storm, 12 
GENETICS MED. S39, S66 (2010) (citing Cho et al., supra note 64; Merz et al., supra note 65). 
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booths on the road to discovery.”68 Sir John Sulston, a Nobel laureate biologist, 
said that patents on human genes are “going to get in the way of treatment” and 
“going to get in the way of research,” and thus admonished that “scientists and 
lawmakers must resist attempts by corporations and individuals to patent hu-
man genes.”69 A 2001 survey of 1,229 geneticists found that “a clear majority 
(75%) disapprove of patenting DNA altogether”; indeed, “61% of industry sci-
entists disapprove.”70 
One might think that the exception to patent infringement for experimental 
use would alleviate these concerns about patents inhibiting scientific research, 
but that exception is too constricted to solve these problems. As the Federal 
Circuit held in Madey v. Duke University, that exception is “very narrow and 
strictly limited” to use of a patent “for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or 
for strictly philosophical inquiry.”71 Insofar as Madey considered “educating 
and enlightening students,” “increas[ing] the status of the institution and 
lur[ing] lucrative research grants” to be “business objectives” beyond the pale 
of the experimental use exception, it seems impossible for even the most aca-
demic of researchers to avail themselves of this exception.72 
As an attempt to allow corporations and individuals to patent human genes, 
the draft legislation is directly contrary to the expressed views of these and 
other research scientists. If nothing else, that suggests an urgent need for poli-
cymakers to solicit the views of the research science community on this legis-
lative proposal, akin to how the American Bar Association solicited the input 
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in the 1930s.73 
Indeed, a representative of the ABA Patent Section in 1932 regretted failing to 
consult the scientific community first, saying that “the cart was put before the 
horse” when the Patent Section surveyed lawyers before scientists.74 It would 
seem to behoove the Senate Intellectual Property Subcommittee to make that 
same outreach to scientists today. 
 
68. FRANCIS COLLINS, THE LANGUAGE OF LIFE: DNA AND THE REVOLUTION IN 
PERSONALISED MEDICINE 113 (2010). 
69. Alok Jha, Human Genome Project Leader Warns Against Attempts to Patent Genes, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 24, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2010/jun/24/human-genome-pro-
ject-patent-genes. 
70. Isaac Rabino, How Human Geneticists in US View Commercialization of the Human Ge-
nome Project, 29 NATURE GENETICS 15, 15 (2001). 
71. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
72. Id.; see Cristina Weschler, The Informal Experimental Use Exception: University Research 
After Madey v. Duke University, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1536, 1543–44 (2004). 
73. See Spencer, supra note 41, at 82; Rossman et al., supra note 50, at 29. 
74. Spencer, supra note 41, at 80. 
DUAN_MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/21  12:34 PM 
152 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 24:2 
 
C.  Do Patents Motivate Research Scientists? 
Perhaps the inhibitory effect of patents on other scientists’ research might 
be tolerable if the holders of those patents were encouraged by virtue of their 
patent rights to engage in more research themselves. Yet there is little reason to 
believe that this is the case: Research scientists appear not to be strongly moti-
vated by patent rights. 
A 2010 report from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
on gene patents concluded that, as a general matter, scientists are motivated by 
incentives other than patents, including “the desire to advance understanding, 
help their patients by developing treatments for disease, advance their careers, 
and enhance their reputations.”75 Interviews with Alzheimer’s researchers 
found that they “expressed ambivalence about patenting” and were primarily 
“driven by wanting priority of scientific discovery, prestige, scientific credit, 
and the ability to secure funding for additional research based on scientific 
achievement.”76 A study commissioned by the National Research Council 
found that only 7% of academic researchers found patents to be of moderate 
importance to the work they pursued; far more important were scientific im-
portance (97%), personal interest (95%), feasibility of the study (88%), and ac-
cess to funding (80%).77 “If patents added ‘the fuel of interest to the fire of 
genius,’ in Abraham Lincoln’s famous phrase, it was here at best a tiny pile of 
kindling at the outer margin of a large conflagration.”78 
Nor do patents on natural laws or products appear to be necessary to stim-
ulate investment in research. While the HHS report found that patents do en-
courage private investment in genetics, public funding of research plays an 
 
75. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & SOC’Y, DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS 
TO GENETIC TESTS 20 (Apr. 2010) [hereinafter SACGHS REPORT], https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2013/11/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf (citing John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Tech-
nology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY 
L.J. 101 (2001)). 
76. Katie Skeehan, Christopher Heaney & Robert Cook-Deegan, Impact of Gene Patents and 
Licensing Practices on Access to Genetic Testing for Alzheimer’s Disease, 12 GENETICS MED. S71, 
S77 (2010). 
77. See JOHN P. WALSH, CHARLENE CHO & WESLEY M. COHEN, PATENTS, MATERIAL 
TRANSFERS AND ACCESS TO RESEARCH INPUTS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: FINAL REPORT TO THE 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES’ COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN GENOMIC 
AND PROTEIN-RELATED INVENTIONS 13 (Sept. 20, 2005), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/down-
load?doi=10.1.1.531.1401&rep=rep1&type=pdf; COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN 
GENOMIC & PROTEIN RESEARCH & INNOVATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAPING THE 
BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 122 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2006), https://
www.nap.edu/read/11487/chapter/1. 
78. Skeehan et al., supra note 76, at S77. 
DUAN_MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/21  12:34 PM 
2020] PATENT ELIGIBILITY LEGISLATION 153 
 
especially outsized role in stimulating basic research.79 Thus, to the extent that 
subject matter such as genes are ineligible for patenting, public funding is a 
tested and effective supplement. 
It is sometimes suggested that the possibility of patents on discoveries spurs 
“races” that speed up those discoveries, but history repeatedly shows those 
races to be detrimental to scientists’ collaborations and to the research itself.80 
Perhaps most instructive is the “patent race” between the Human Genome Pro-
ject and Celera in 1990s.81 HGP had pledged to make the results of its sequenc-
ing the human genome “freely available and in the public domain for both re-
search and development, in order to maximize its benefit to society”; Celera, 
by contrast, attracted $400 million in investment on the promise that it would 
patent its discovered genes. Those favoring broad patentability might have pre-
dicted that Celera would have the incentives to win this race, but in fact the 
opposite was true: Celera failed to keep up and in fact ended up copying the 
public project’s results wholesale to keep up appearances that it was moving 
forward. As Dr. Francis Collins, leader of the public project, wrote: 
Today, virtually all observers agree that the complete and immediate 
public availability of the human genome sequence was a critical com-
ponent of its success. . . . Had the cries for privatization of this effort 
won out in 1999, this would now be a very different world. 
The evidence that patents on scientific discoveries will encourage research 
is mixed at best and condemnatory at worst. Lawmakers must carefully con-
sider the above evidence before upending longstanding expectations of the sci-
entific community. 
IV.  EFFECTS FOR DRUG PRICES AND HEALTH CARE 
Patents on genes and scientific discoveries, as enabled by the draft legisla-
tion, will increase costs and decrease quality and availability of American 
health care. This result should be especially concerning to Congress and poli-
cymakers, coming at a time when 30% of American patients report not taking 
 
79. See SACGHS REPORT, supra note 75, at 25–26. 
80. See Kurt Kleiner & Phyllida Brown, Patent Row Splits Breast Cancer Researchers, NEW 
SCIENTIST (Sept. 24, 1994), https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg14319440-300-patent-row-
splits-breast-cancer-researchers/ (research laboratory “decided to stop working with the researchers at 
the University of Utah because of disagreement over the ethics of patenting DNA”; laboratory director 
“fears that the split will weaken future research”). 
81. This is based on COLLINS, supra note 68, at 301–05. 
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a medicine as prescribed due to cost,82 and when American voters consistently 
rate drug pricing as their number one priority for Congress.83 
Indeed, even scholars skeptical of the recent Supreme Court decisions on 
§ 101 reject the approach the draft legislation takes. Professor Dreyfuss and 
colleagues explain that a “dramatic expansion of patentable subject matter” will 
raise questions as to “the patient access problems that animated the Myriad case 
in the first place.”84 After observing that the effect of Myriad was that “patient 
access to BRCA diagnostics improved rapidly,” they write: “Surely, the goal 
cannot be to roll back the potential for these developments.”85 Yet that is surely 
what the present draft text does. 
A. A Tool for Drug Patent Evergreening 
Expanding patent eligibility will enable pharmaceutical companies to ex-
tend the duration of patent protection and delay entry of cost-cutting generics 
and biosimilars. This is because the newly eligible subject matter will be a 
prime target for the practice of “evergreening,” in which a drug company ob-
tains a patent on a minor modification to a known drug compound, often years 
after the initial patent application on the drug was filed.86 
The most common strategy for evergreening is for a pharmaceutical com-
pany to obtain patents on methods of using a drug, such as forms of delivery or 
dosage amounts.87 Currently, under Mayo, at least one form of evergreening is 
impermissible: patenting a correlation between a diagnostic test and adjustment 
of administration of a drug.88 The draft legislation, by abrogating Mayo, would 
enable that type of patent as an evergreening strategy. Indeed, drug companies 
 
82. Ashley Kirzinger et al., KFF Health Tracking Poll—February 2019: Prescription Drugs, 
HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/kff-
health-tracking-poll-february-2019-prescription-drugs/. 
83. See POLITICO & HARVARD T.H. CHAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, AMERICANS’ PRIORITIES 
FOR THE NEW CONGRESS IN 2019, at 2 (Dec. 2018), https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/
sites/94/2018/12/Politico-Harvard-Poll-Dec-2018-Priorities-for-New-Congress-in-2019.pdf; Rachel 
Roubein, Politico–Harvard Poll: New Congress Should Fight Hate Crimes, Tackle Drug Prices, 
POLITICO (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/03/politico-harvard-poll-hate-
crimes-drug-prices-1077879. 
84. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al., Patenting Nature—A Comparative Perspective, 5 J.L. & 
BIOSCIENCES 550, 580 (2018). 
85. Id. 
86. See generally Gregory H. Jones, Michael A. Carrier, Richard T. Silver & Hagop Kantarjian, 
Strategies That Delay or Prevent the Timely Availability of Affordable Generic Drugs in the United 
States, 127 BLOOD 1398, 1399–400 (2016) (describing “evergreening” or “product hopping” as “a 
brand-name company switching the market for a drug, prior to its patent expiration date, to a reformu-
lated version that has a later-expiring patent, but which offers little or no therapeutic advantages”). 
87. See id. at 1399 (“The newer version, for example, could have a slightly different tablet or 
capsule dose or a slow-release formulation (given once a day rather than twice daily).”). 
88. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 87 (2012). 
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have already repeatedly tried to obtain eligibility-questionable patents in an ef-
fort to broaden and preserve their patent monopolies over drugs and medical 
treatments.89 
When generic entry is delayed through strategies such as this, American 
consumers pay the price. Commentators report that “the average markup for 
patented drugs is nearly 400%,” and “introducing generic competition can 
cause prices to fall to as little as 6% of the patent-protected price.”90 A month’s 
supply of the cholesterol-lowering drug atorvastatin (Lipitor) cost about $165 
while under patent and $15 after the patent expired.91 All these cost savings 
stand to be lost if inventors can extend their patents by delaying filing. Extend-
ing the patent on Lipitor, for example, would have cost Americans about $41 
million per day.92 
The draft legislation also appears to abrogate, perhaps unintentionally, the 
doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting, a “judicially-created doctrine” 
which derives from § 101.93 That doctrine is recognized as exceptionally im-
portant to prevention of evergreening.94 
Evergreening is valuable for drug companies—and costly to American pa-
tients and consumers. The draft legislation, by enabling a wholly new class of 
 
89. See, e.g., Vanda Pharm. Inc. v. W.-Ward Pharm. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117, 1120–21 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018) (disputing under § 101 a method-of-use patent that would extend patent protection by 11 
years), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Hikma Pharm. USA Inc. v. Vanda Pharm. Inc., No. 18-817 
(U.S. petition filed Dec. 27, 2018); Esoterix Genetic Labs. LLC v. Qiagen Inc., 133 F. Supp. 3d 349, 
351 (D. Mass. 2015) (rejecting under Mayo a patent directed to a “correlation between a naturally-
occurring mutation in a cancer cell, and the likelihood that a particular type of known pharmaceutical 
compound will be effective in treating that type of cancer”). 
90. Hannah Brennan et al., A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government 
Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 275, 284–85 (2016) (citing FDA and other studies); 
Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, Generic Entry and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals, 6 J. ECON. 
MGMT. STRATEGY 75, 83–84 & fig. 2 (1997) (finding that generic drug prices drop to below 50% of 
the patent-based price within 3 years of patent expiration). 
91. See W. Nicholson Price II, Expired Patents, Trade Secrets, and Stymied Competition, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1611, 1622 & n.67 (2017) [hereinafter Price 2017]. 
92. That number is computed as follows: The U.S. Census Bureau estimates the population of 
Americans aged 40 and over at 147 million in 2012. The CDC reports that 27.9% of that population 
used a cholesterol-lowering medication, and 20.2% of them used atorvastatin. See QIUPING GU ET AL., 
NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NCHS DATA 
BRIEF NO. 177, PRESCRIPTION CHOLESTEROL-LOWERING MEDICATION USE IN ADULTS AGED 40 
AND OVER: UNITED STATES, 2003–2012, at 1–2 (Dec. 2014), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/data-
briefs/db177.pdf. Thus, 8.29 million Americans used atorvastatin in 2012. The difference between the 
on-patent and off-patent daily cost is $5 ($150 per month divided by 30 days), leading to a nationwide 
cost of $41.45 million per day. 
93. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 619 F.3d 1329, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
94. See Douglas L. Rogers, Double Patenting: Follow-on Pharmaceutical Patents that Sup-
press Competition, 14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 317, 320 (2017). 
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evergreening, would be a win for the pharmaceutical industry and a loss to eve-
ryone else. 
B.  Development of Diagnostic Tests and Treatments 
Patents on genes and natural principles will not simply raise prices for 
health care; they will delay or perhaps even prevent the development of critical 
treatments. As discussed above,95 science researchers report that patents on 
genes or discoveries of natural laws can stall their research. When they are un-
able to conduct research, they cannot produce improved diagnostic tests or even 
new medicines and treatments. 
The possibility that important and threatening disorders will go unre-
searched and thus untreated is no mere hypothesis; it is proven by history. Prior 
to the Supreme Court’s 2013 Myriad decision, patents on genes were routinely 
issued.96 During that period, multiple studies found examples of important re-
search being stalled. The Department of Health and Human Services reported 
that owners of gene patents used those patents to stop research on breast cancer, 
hearing loss, Alzheimer’s disease, long QT syndrome, Canavan disease, and 
leukemia among others.97 Indeed, gene patents demonstrably failed to speed up 
innovation. After researching numerous instances of gene patents, researchers 
found that “in no case that was studied was a holder of exclusive intellectual 
property rights to a gene the first to develop a test. Rather, intellectual property 
rights are typically invoked only after numerous laboratories have already de-
veloped testing and then are used to clear the market of competition.”98 
Furthermore, gene patents during that period prevented patients from ob-
taining critical genetic tests at all. As Dr. Roger Klein observed in 2007, “Hold-
ers or licensees of patents on genes, genetic variants and their biological corre-
lations are already using the threat of litigation to prevent pathologists and other 
laboratory professionals from performing clinical, diagnostic molecular genetic 
tests.”99 A 10-year-old girl named Abigail was reportedly unable to obtain a test 
for long QT syndrome due to assertion of a patent on the gene; she died as a 
result.100 
 
95. See Section III.B supra notes 61–74 and accompanying text. 
96. See Andrew W. Torrance, Gene Concepts, Gene Talk, and Gene Patents, 11 MINN. J. L. 
SCI. & TECH. 157, 176–79 (2010). 
97. SACGHS REPORT, supra note 75, at 40–42. 
98. James P. Evans, Putting Patients Before Patents, 12 GENETICS MED. S3, S3 (2010), https://
www.nature.com/articles/gim2010139.pdf. 
99. Roger D. Klein, Gene Patents and Genetic Testing in the United States, 25 NATURE 
BIOTECH. 989, 989 (2007). 
100. See Stifling or Stimulating—The Role of Gene Patents in Research and Genetic Testing: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 40 (Oct. 30, 2007), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-
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The pharmaceutical industry has tried to pin the blame for lack of access to 
medical treatments on health insurance policy, in an attempt to avoid responsi-
bility due to patents.101 Yet the 2010 HHS report considered this argument and 
flatly rejected it, noting that a patent holder had full discretion to refuse to per-
form testing under health insurance plans; “It is the decision of a [patent] rights-
holding sole provider . . . that has caused access problems for some patients,” 
not problems with insurance policy.102 
C.  Ability to Obtain Second Opinions 
Expansion of patentable subject matter will further injure American health 
care by preventing patients from obtaining second opinions. It is a time-hon-
ored practice that a patient, before undergoing major medical treatment in view 
of a single practitioner’s diagnosis, seek a second opinion. A second opinion 
“remains the best method of ensuring the highest diagnostic accuracy for cancer 
patients and patients with other serious conditions who go to an institution for 
definitive treatment.”103 
Yet where the owner of a patent on a human gene refuses to license the 
patent to other testing services in order to clear the market of competitors—a 
common practice when gene patents were considered valid104—no alternative 
exists, meaning no second opinion is possible. As a result, medical profession-
als warned that patents on genes were “eliminating patient opportunities . . . to 
confirm the accuracy of test results.”105 
To the extent that American patients are unable to obtain second opinions 
because of diagnostic or gene patents, the quality of health care suffers. More 
troublingly, there will be at least some patients who opt for surgery or serious 
medical treatment, who would not have done so had they obtained a conflicting 
second opinion.106 The granting of patents on genes or diagnostics that blockade 
 
110hhrg38639/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg38639.pdf (statement of Dr. Marc Grodman, CEO of Bio-Refer-
ence Laboratories, Inc.). Apparently the test was unavailable at the relevant time because the patent 
owner, University of Utah, licensed the relevant patents to only one testing firm at a time; the licensee 
in 2002 went bankrupt, leaving no available testing service until 2004. See id. at 48–50 (statement of 
Dr. Wendy Chung); Misha Angrist et al., Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing Practices on Access 
to Genetic Testing for Long QT Syndrome, 12 GENETICS MED. S111, S120 (2010), https://www.nature.
com/articles/gim2010145. 
101. See SACGHS REPORT, supra note 75, at 45. 
102. Id. 
103. Timothy Craig Allen, Second Opinions: Pathologists’ Preventive Medicine, 3 ARCH. 
PATH. & LAB’Y MED. 310, 310 (2013). 
104. See SACGHS REPORT, supra note 75, at 33. 
105. Klein, supra note 99, at 990; Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 63, at S30 (“Myriad’s patent 
position has made it in effect a sole provider of clinical BRCA testing in the United States . . . .”). 
106. See Suzanne Zuppello, I Had a Mastectomy to Lessen My Risk of Breast Cancer. Does 
New Science Say That Was a Mistake?, THE OUTLINE (Sept. 18, 2018), https://theoutline.com/post/
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second opinions will thus impose wasteful costs on the health care system—
not to mention traumatic costs to patients who receive unnecessary mastecto-
mies or other treatments. 
D.  Safety and Efficacy of Medical Tests 
To make matters worse, there is historical reason to believe that even the 
limited services made available by holders of gene or diagnostic patents will be 
subpar in both quality and safety, producing wrong or even dangerous results. 
While regulatory systems such as Food and Drug Administration approval 
ensure a baseline level of efficacy and safety of medical treatments, it has al-
ways been the case that the strongest driver of quality is market competition. 
Competition forces firms to out-innovate each other and to produce better prod-
ucts at lower costs compared to their rivals.107 Absent competition—such as 
when a firm faces no rivals because it possesses a patent—that firm has dimin-
ished incentives both to ensure that its product is of high quality and to improve 
upon its product offerings. This is no less true in the medical diagnostics indus-
try. 
Experience with Myriad’s patents on breast cancer testing show these con-
cerns to be real. Researchers have observed that Myriad’s testing protocol failed 
to identify numerous mutations of the relevant genes, and because Myriad was 
the exclusive provider of such testing in view of its patents, no better testing 
protocol was publicly available in the United States.108 A comparative study of 
breast cancer screening between the United States and France determined that, 
because Myriad limited the American market to a single testing technique while 
French hospitals used several, patients in France enjoyed substantially lower 
costs for services of equal quality.109 And Myriad’s use of its patents against 




107. See Philippe Aghion et al., The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity, 
91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 20, 21–22, 27 (2009); Charles Duan, Of Monopolies and Monocultures: The 
Intersection of Patents and National Security, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 399–400 
(2020). 
108. See Tom Walsh et al., Spectrum of Mutations in BRCA1, BRCA2, CHEK2, and TP53 in 
Families at High Risk of Breast Cancer, 295 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1379, 1380 (2006); Cook-Deegan et 
al., supra note 63, at S30; Sophie Gad et al., Identification of a Large Rearrangement of the BRCA1 
Gene Using Colour Bar Code on Combed DNA in an American Breast/Ovarian Cancer Family Pre-
viously Studied by Direct Sequencing, 38 J. MED. GENETICS 388, 388 (2001). 
109. See Christine Sevilla et al., Impact of Gene Patents on the Cost-Effective Delivery of Care: 
The Case of BRCA1 Genetic Testing, 19 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 287, 295–96 
(2003). 
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parties, for example to evaluate test performance metrics such as sensitivity, 
specificity, or positive predictive value, is particularly jeopardized.”110 
Certainly it is the nature of patents generally that they will diminish com-
petitive pressure toward quality and safety; this observation should not be taken 
to mean that medical technology ought categorically to be unpatentable. But 
the effects of patent exclusivity on genetic and diagnostic tests are especially 
severe—errors lead to improvident surgery or undiagnosed deadly disorders—
and as discussed elsewhere in this article, patents for gene and diagnostic dis-
coveries appear to be a weak incentive for discovery or innovation in those 
industries.111 Furthermore, unlike patents on human-created technologies, pa-
tents on genes or diagnostic correlations cannot be designed around: One can-
not change one’s own genetic code to avoid patent infringement.112 Those con-
sequences are good reason for the patent system specifically to exclude human 
genes and laws of nature from eligibility for patenting. 
V.  EFFECTS FOR INNOVATION 
Against these concerns about impediments to medical treatment and scien-
tific research weighs the possibility that expanded patent protection for laws 
and products of nature will stimulate invention and innovation. Yet there is 
substantial reason to doubt this and to worry, in fact, that patents on genes and 
diagnostic tests will undermine innovation rather than advance it. 
A.  Development of Genetic Testing Services 
The particular nature of genetic testing means that gene patents are espe-
cially detrimental to innovation. Because the cost of sequencing is relatively 
cheap, genetic testing services often sequence complete genomes.113 Further-
more, genetic diagnostic services generally focus not on identification of a sin-
gle gene, but on packages of genes of interest.114 
As a result, where patents are issued on individual genes, innovators will 
need to obtain licenses to many or all of them. A whole-genome sequencing 
 
110. Vural Ozdemir et al., Shifting Emphasis from Pharmacogenomics to Theragnostics, 24 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 942, 943 (2006). 
111. See supra Section III.C, infra Section V.B. 
112. See SACGHS REPORT, supra note 75, at 15 (“It is generally difficult if not impossible to 
“invent around” patent claims on genes and associations.”). 
113. See Megan Molteni, Now You Can Sequence Your Whole Genome for Just $200, WIRED 
(Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/whole-genome-sequencing-cost-200-dollars/. 
114. See The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part III: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Intellectual Property of the S. Judiciary Comm., 116th Cong. 3 (2019) (testimony of Sean George, 
Invitae Corp.), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/George%20Testimony.pdf (describ-
ing panel testing for multiple genes as “now the standard of care”). 
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service would theoretically need to obtain a license for “all or many of the thou-
sands of human genome sequences subject to patent protection,” for exam-
ple.115 This leads to a problem that scholars have called the “tragedy of the an-
ticommons”: When the field of genetics is finely subdivided among thousands 
of patent owners, it creates “a spiral of overlapping patent claims in the hands 
of different owners, reaching ever further upstream in the course of biomedical 
research,” thereby “adding to the cost and slowing the pace of downstream bi-
omedical innovation.”116 “Navigating the complex intellectual property land-
scape of DNA patents,” write two scientists, “could slow some promising clin-
ical technologies.”117 
In considering his experience as a laboratory researcher, NIH Director 
Dr. Francis Collins found gene patents to be an impediment rather than an in-
centive for innovation in genetics. After noting the ordinary merit of patents for 
encouraging commercialization of inventions, he wrote: 
I think this argument falls flat when it comes to diagnostic applica-
tions. . . . [T]he supposed need to provide an incentive for companies to 
develop DNA diagnostics is unconvincing. In that situation, many of us 
would argue that it would be better for the public to have competition 
in the marketplace, in order to provide an incentive for higher quality 
and lower price.118 
That perspective, characteristic of many prominent figures in the scientific 
community, should give lawmakers pause given the draft legislation’s contrary 
view. 
B.  Can Patent Ineligibility Encourage Innovation? 
By contrast, the lack of patent eligibility for human genes and diagnostic 
tests since 2012 does not appear to have diminished innovation in these spaces. 
 
115. See, e.g., Dan Vorhaus & John Conley, Whole-Genome Sequencing and Gene Patents Co-
exist (For Now), GENOMICS L. REP. (RENAMED PRIVACY REP.) (Aug. 11, 2009), https://theprivacyre-
port.com/2009/08/11/whole-genome-sequencing-and-gene-patents-coexist-for-now/. Some scholars 
have disputed this, claiming that there are whole-genome sequencing technologies that avoid infring-
ing gene patents. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Unblocked Future: Why Gene Patents Won’t Hinder 
Whole Genome Sequencing and Personalized Medicine, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1601, 1606 (2012) 
[hereinafter Price 2012]; Dreyfuss et al., supra note 84, at 551 & n.5. These arguments underestimate 
the capability of skilled patent practitioners, and they further assume the continued viability of Mayo, 
which the draft legislation would abrogate. See Price 2012, supra, at 1618. 
116. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anti-
commons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698–99 (1998). 
117. Subhashini Chandrasekharan & Robert Cook-Deegan, Gene Patents and Personalized 
Medicine—What Lies Ahead?, 1 GENOME MED. 92, 93 (2009). 
118. COLLINS, supra note 68, at 112. 
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Research by Professors Arti Rai and Colleen Chien found “[n]o clear evidence” 
of any decline in innovation in diagnostic methods following the Mayo decision 
restricting patents in that space, and indeed find increases in biomarker trans-
actions and FDA diagnostics approvals since the decision.119 As they explain, 
“We looked for clear evidence of a sustained decline in diagnostic patent appli-
cations and transactions post-Mayo. We didn’t find it.”120 As Professor Shubha 
Ghosh said, “When Myriad was decided in 2013, everybody sounded the death 
knell of biotechnology. . . . It certainly isn’t that.”121 
In a study of barriers to the development of personalized medicine (PM) 
technology, researchers reviewed 32 articles on intellectual property and 20 on 
incentives for PM development.122 After noting commentary both supporting 
and opposing expanded patent rights for personalized medicine, the researchers 
concluded: 
What is clear from the literature is a lack of consensus on whether (i) 
patents act as necessary incentives to PM investment, innovation, and 
development such that they should be strengthened, or (ii) patents stifle 
innovation and investment, particularly in the device space, such that 
novel incentives are needed and patent rights should be curtailed.123 
Similarly, economists find no increase in innovation resulting from patents 
on genes. In a study of gene patents in the early 2000s, two economists find that 
those genes for which a patent is applied tend to be economically more valuable 
 
119. Arti K. Rai with Colleen Chien, Presentation at the Duke Center for Applied Genomics 
and Precision Medicine: Intellectual Property in Precision Medicine 24–26 (Feb. 15, 2018), https://
precisionmedicine.duke.edu/about/calendar/genomic-and-precision-medicine-forum-arti-rai-jd. 
120. Colleen V. Chien & Arti K. Rai, Presentation at the USPTO Roundtable on Section 101: 
Dx Innovation in Decline? An Empirical Analysis Post-Mayo 19 (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.uspto.
gov/sites/default/files/documents/RT2%206-2%20Colleen%20Chien.pdf (emphasis removed). 
121. Turna Ray, Supreme Court Patent Cases Haven’t Hindered Diagnostics Innovation, Pre-
liminary Data Suggest, GENOMEWEB (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.genomeweb.com/molecular-diag-
nostics/supreme-court-patent-cases-havent-hindered-diagnostics-innovation-preliminary. By contrast, 
Professor Taylor’s recent survey purports to find evidence of startup investors’ choices of investments 
being affected by the Supreme Court’s decisions. See David O. Taylor, Patent Eligibility and Invest-
ment, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 2019, 2027–28 (2020). There are several reasons to question the usefulness 
of this study, though. The response rate to his survey was less than 4%; given that his survey invitation 
specifically asked about views on the Supreme Court decisions, a reasonable inference is that 96% of 
investors do not care about them. See id. at 2051 & n.120. Taylor further concedes that those who 
responded to his survey were uncharacteristic of the overall population, further limiting the reliability 
of his results. See id. at 2051–52. 
122. See Lori Knowles et al., Paving the Road to Personalized Medicine: Recommendations on 
Regulatory, Intellectual Property and Reimbursement Challenges, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 453, 492–93 
(2017). 
123. Id. at 493. 
DUAN_MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/21  12:34 PM 
162 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 24:2 
 
(unsurprisingly, since one would not spend the money applying for a patent on 
something without value), but find no evidence that the presence of a patent 
stimulated greater research and development compared to the denial of one.124 
The views of genetic testing services themselves are significant in this re-
spect. In an amicus curiae brief filed with the Supreme Court, two genetic test-
ing laboratories explained that they were perfectly happy to have their discov-
eries of particular genes be published in academic literature and entered into 
the public domain. Noting that they were able to obtain patents on “applications 
of laws of nature such as new drugs, reagents, or equipment,”125 the laboratories 
asserted that publication, not patenting, of discoveries of genes would “allow 
for inventions to be created and for doctors to treat patients more effectively.”126 
The laboratories accordingly would continue to research and even publish new 
genes even without the possibility of patent protection.127 
The views of those labs echo the Supreme Court’s words in Chakrabarty 
when it considered the patentability of naturally occurring bacteria: 
The grant or denial of patents on micro-organisms is not likely to put 
an end to genetic research or to its attendant risks. The large amount of 
research that has already occurred when no researcher had sure 
knowledge that patent protection would be available suggests that leg-
islative or judicial fiat as to patentability will not deter the scientific 
mind from probing into the unknown any more than Canute could com-
mand the tides.128 
In the end, the evidence from the research and development community 
suggests that patents for human genes and other natural phenomena are likely 
 
124. See Bhaven Sampat & Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents Affect Follow-On Innovation? 
Evidence from the Human Genome, 109 AM. ECON. REV. 203, 231–32 (2019). The authors take this 
conclusion also to mean that patents do not deter follow-on research by others, but this conclusion is 
questionable for several reasons. For one thing, the authors hypothesize that the USPTO’s requirement 
of especially detailed disclosure of gene sequences is the actual driver of follow-on research. See id. at 
231. Other fields of research do not trigger the same stringent disclosure requirements, so the same 
level of follow-on research should not be expected elsewhere. See id. Furthermore, the thrust of the 
paper is to reject the hypothesis that the grant of a patent will deter innovation while the denial of a 
patent application will not, but that ignores the fact that the filing of the application itself may be 
sufficient to deter follow-on innovation in the first place. 
125. Brief for ARUP Laboratories, Inc. and Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings 
(d/b/a LabCorp) as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 19, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (Sept. 9, 2011) (No. 10-1150), https://www.americanbar.org/con-
tent/dam/aba/publishing/previewbriefs/Other_Brief_Updates/10-1150_petitioneramcuarupandlab-
corp.pdf. 
126. Id. at 17. 
127. See id. at 16–17. 
128. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980). 
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not a significant factor in stimulating innovation. Given the potentially im-
mense harms to the public and to scientific research that those patents could 
cause, the balance of public policy ought to tilt heavily against upsetting the 
historic limitations on patent ineligibility of natural laws and phenomena. 
VI.  EFFECTS FOR SCIENTIFIC NORMS, MEDICAL ETHICS, AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
Scholars and commentators have recognized that patents on laws and prod-
ucts of nature are in tension with important normative and societal values. 
Scientific norms.   Under the generally accepted Mertonian view of scien-
tific ethics, “The substantive findings of science are a product of social collab-
oration and assigned to the community,” so the responsibility of the scientist is 
to share discoveries with the world such that all may benefit from those discov-
eries and conduct further research based on them.129 The National Research 
Council has said that “scientific progress requires that research results be open 
for all to use, attempt to replicate, and evaluate.”130 The Royal Society similarly 
has said: “Only by having knowledge unencumbered by property rights can the 
scientific community disseminate information and take science forward”; thus, 
“pure knowledge about the physical world should not be patentable under any 
circumstances.”131 
Patents on scientific discoveries obviously are irreconcilable with these 
principles of openness and collaboration in science. 
Medical ethics.   Like scientists, doctors have ethical responsibilities to 
“continue to study, apply, and advance scientific knowledge” and to “make rel-
evant information available to patients, colleagues, and the public.”132 The 
American Medical Association specifically warns against patents on natural 
products, noting in its ethics opinions that “patents on processes, e.g. to isolate 
and purify gene sequences, are ethically preferable to patents on the substances 
themselves,” and that any medical patents “should be carefully constructed to 
ensure that the patent holder does not limit the use of a naturally occurring form 
 
129. Robert K. Merton, A Note on Science and Democracy, 1 J. LEGAL & POL. SOC. 115, 121 
(1942). 
130. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 26 (Stephen A. 
Merrill et al. eds., 2004), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/10976/a-patent-system-for-the-21st-century 
(citing ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS (1973)). 
131. THE ROYAL SOC’Y, KEEPING SCIENCE OPEN: THE EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
POLICY ON THE CONDUCT OF SCIENCE para. 3.5, at 8 (Apr. 2003). 
132. AMA, AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS sec. VII (2001), https://www.ama-assn.
org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/principles-of-medical-ethics.pdf. 
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of the substance in question.”133 Patents on products of nature and scientific 
discoveries are contrary to these principles. 
Patents on diagnostic tests further conflict with doctors’ obligations toward 
their patients because they potentially force doctors to withhold medical infor-
mation from those patients. Consider an example proffered by the Cato Insti-
tute, in which a discovery is made that the presence of gum disease correlates 
with a risk of heart attack.134 That discovery is patented. A dentist, in the course 
of a routine cleaning, observes that indicative gum disease. Is the dentist to 
inform the patient and infringe the patent, or to honor the patent and thus let 
potentially lifesaving information go unmentioned?135 
Human rights.   Gene patents have been considered to infringe rights of 
human integrity and self-determination.136 Multiple international bodies have 
recognized a human right to one’s genetic resources and further observed that 
the patenting of another person’s genes, particularly without consent, can be 
concerning from a human rights perspective. The United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization’s Universal Declaration on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, provides: “Benefits from advances in biology, genetics and medicine, 
concerning the human genome, shall be made available to all, with due regard 
for the dignity and human rights of each individual.”137 Over 80 religious 
groups have opposed gene patents for similar reasons.138 
 
133. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMA, AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 
§ 7.2.3(c) (2016), https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/code-medical-ethics-overview, 
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/code-medical-ethics-overview. 
134. See Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Institute et al. in Support of Petitioners at 26, Mayo Col-
laborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (Sept. 9, 2011) (No. 10-1150), https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/previewbriefs/Other_Brief_Updates/10-1150_petition-
eramcucatoinst-reasonfound-andcei.pdf (citing Kevin Emerson Collins, Constructive Nonvolition in 
Patent Law and the Problem of Insufficient Thought Control, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 759, 760). 
135. See id. at 27 (noting that the consequence of such a patent is to render mere thought to be 
infringement). It is unclear whether the exception to patent infringement for medical treatments would 
apply to medical diagnoses. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A) (“the term ‘medical activity’ means the 
performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body”). Even if it does, there are plenty of equally 
concerning situations imaginable. Is it inducement of patent infringement, for example, for a medical 
instructor to teach the correlation between gum disease and risk of heart attack? 
136. See Lori B. Andrews & Jordan Paradise, Gene Patents: The Need for Bioethics Scrutiny 
and Legal Change, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 403, 409–11 (2005). 
137. Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, Gen. Conf. Res. 16, 
UNESCO, 29th Sess., at art. 12(a), Doc. 29 C/Resolutions, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/
pf0000110220, adopted by G.A. Res. 53/152, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 53d Sess., Agenda Item 110(b), 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/152, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/53/152. 
138. See Fred B. Charatan, US Religious Groups Oppose Gene Patents, 310 BRIT. MED. J. 
1351, 1351 (1995), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2549785/pdf/bmj00594-0013.
pdf. 
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VII.  ALTERNATIVES TO THE DRAFT LEGISLATION 
To the extent that any revision of § 101 is to be considered, it must be in 
tandem with substantial other revisions to related sections of the patent laws, as 
multiple scholars recognize. 
For example, Professor Dreyfuss and colleagues—no friends of the current 
§ 101 case law—agree that any alterations of that law must be joined with 
changes to other patent laws to facilitate research and to lower drug prices. The 
authors note that the 2010 HHS report called for “creation of exemptions from 
patent infringement for use of genetic tests for patient care purposes and for use 
of patent-protected DNA sequences for research purposes,” and in particular 
expansion of the currently inoperative defense of experimental use.139 They also 
contend that any changes to patent subject matter eligibility should be tied to 
concomitant limitations on patents, including compulsory licensing, or federal 
government provision of services competitive with the patent owner’s, or even 
government cost controls.140 
Similarly, Professor Karshtedt proposes revising subject matter eligibility 
under § 101 in tandem with the utility and 35 U.S.C. § 112 written description 
requirements, and specifically calls for a unified “completeness doctrine” either 
“barring all patent claims directed to objects of basic research” or creating a sui 
generis “partial or intermediate patent right for inventions that . . . fail com-
pleteness,” likely “a limited patent that comes only with the remedy of a com-
pulsory license.”141 These proposals of Professors Dreyfuss, Karshtedt and oth-
ers are further consistent with the League of Nations’ consensus view in the 
1920s on creating a right of scientific property, which would only have entailed 
a right to royalties and no right to exclude.142 
Comprehensive changes to the disclosure requirements under § 112(a) 
would also likely be necessary as well. Multiple independent scholars have 
noted that patents systematically fail to disclose sufficient information on the 
workings of patented inventions, meaning that the public grants a valuable ex-
clusivity while not receiving adequate knowledge in return.143 Indeed, the inad-
equacy of patent disclosure, in combination with the draft legislation, means 
 
139. Dreyfuss et al., supra note 84, at 580 (citing SACGHS REPORT, supra note 75, at 89, 94–
95). 
140. See id. at 585–88. 
141. See Dmitry Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C. L. REV. 
949, 951, 958–59 (2015). 
142. See League of Nations Doc. A.38.1923.XII A, supra note 31, § 14, art. 5, at 25. 
143. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 551 (2009); Price 2017, 
supra note 91, at 1612–13. 
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that a clever patent lawyer could patent a law of nature before it is proven by 
science, with obvious repercussions for downstream research.144 
Good disclosure is important for ensuring that patents promote innovation. 
In one study purporting to show that gene patents did not deter innovation,145 
the authors note that “the USPTO’s specific (and more stringent) requirements 
for the disclosure of sequenced genetic data may have made the disclosure func-
tion particularly effective.” Thus, to the extent that patentability is extended to 
natural laws and products beyond genes, the required disclosures in patents 
should be increased. In the software space, for example, many have called for 
complete disclosure of source code to satisfy the § 112(a) requirement.146 
It is noted that the draft legislation makes a revision to § 112(f),147 but that 
revision is neither necessary nor sufficient. By affecting only the interpretation 
of means-plus-function claims that are primarily noteworthy in software,148 the 
amendment to § 112(f) has minimal effect on gene patents or patents on scien-
tific discoveries. It also makes no improvement to the state of patent disclosure 
as discussed above, which is governed by § 112(a), not § 112(f). 
Changes to claiming practice are warranted, but the correct section to 
amend would be not § 112(f), but § 112(b) and in particular the doctrine of 
enablement of “the full scope of the claimed invention”149 and the propriety of 
single-species disclosures for patent claims covering a broader genus of which 
the disclosed species is just one example.150 There is also an ongoing need to 
strengthen the indefiniteness doctrine under § 112(b) and the obviousness doc-
trine under 35 U.S.C. § 103, both of which have arguably been construed too 
 
144. See Janet Freilich, Prophetic Patents, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.  663, 666–67 (2019). 
145. See Sampat & Williams, supra note 124. But see discussion supra note 124 (noting sub-
stantial limitations of their study). 
146. See, e.g., Kenneth Canfield, The Disclosure of Source Code in Software Patents: Should 
Software Patents Be Open Source?, 7 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1,1 (2006). 
147. See Draft § 101 Text, supra note 6, § 112(f). 
148. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in 
this section) (noting the “proliferation of functional claiming” under § 112(f), then numbered ¶. 6); 
id. at 1350–51 (discussing use of words such as “module” in means-plus-function software claims). 
149. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see Bernard Chao, Rethinking Ena-
blement in the Predictable Arts: Fully Scoping the New Rule, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (arguing 
that “the full scope rule is extremely difficult to apply and will cause unnecessary litigation”). 
150. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (written 
description sufficient for a genus claim “requires the disclosure of either a representative number of 
species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus 
so that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus”); with id. at 1366 
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“Under this new doctrine, patent applicants will face a difficult burden in 
discerning proper claiming procedure under this court’s unpredictable written description of the inven-
tion requirement.”). 
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narrowly,151 and to clarify the obviousness-type double-patenting doctrine, on 
which the Federal Circuit is currently irreconcilably divided.152 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Legislative revision of § 101 has received a great deal of attention, and the 
unexpected consequences of that legislation merit attention as well.153 This ar-
ticle has reviewed many such effects of the recently proposed § 101 legislation, 
including its consequences for altering patentability of human genes and laws 
of nature, effects on drug prices and health care, effects on scientific research, 
effects on technological progress, and interplay with scientific and social norms 
and values. It additionally reviews alternative approaches to the proposed leg-
islation that may alleviate problematic effects. 
Since the rounds of hearings in June of 2019, progress on legislation ap-
pears to have stalled.154 Nevertheless, interest in the legislation continues, as 
one of the Senate proponents and several former U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Officers have expressed.155 It is likely that Congress will return to legislation 
on patentable subject matter eligibility in the coming months or years, and 
should it do so, it is hoped that this article will provide useful guideposts for 
these efforts, taking into account key issues such as drug prices, health care, 
and scientific research. 
The key lesson to be drawn from this article and from history is that caution 
is warranted when considering the creation of exclusive rights to the products 
of scientific discovery. In his 1931 letter advising the Department of Commerce 
against intellectual property rights in scientific discoveries, Edward Rogers 
 
151. See Brief of Public Knowledge and the Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner, Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., No. 15-561 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2015), 
https://www.publicknowledge.org/documents/pk-eff-nautilus-ii-cert; Brief of Amici Curiae Public 
Knowledge and the Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Petitioner, K/S HIMPP v. Hear-Wear 
Techs., LLC, 135 S. Ct. 1439 (Jan. 22, 2015) (No. 14-744) (cert. denied), https://www.pub-
licknowledge.org/documents/pk-and-eff-brief-himpp-v-hear-wear. 
152. See Brief of the R Street Institute and Public Knowledge as Amici Curiae in Support of 
the Petition at 5–8, Mylan Pharm. v. UCB, Inc., No. 18-692 (U.S. Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.su-
premecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-692/77397/20181221151024017_brief-mylan-ucb-petition.pdf. 
153. See KEVIN J. HICKEY, PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER REFORM IN THE 116TH 
CONGRESS 30-33 (Cong. Research Serv., Report No. R45918, 2019). 
154. See Kirk M. Hartung, Supreme Court Passes on 101 Patent Eligibility, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 
14, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e23916ed-c871-4dde-a89c-
21a58bfddd63. 
155. See AIPLA Q&A with Senator Thom Tillis, AIPLA (July 1, 2020), https://www.aipla.org/
detail/news/2020/07/01/aipla-q-a-with-senator-thom-tillis; Andrei Iancu, Dir. of the U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office, Remarks at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Event “How Innovation and Creativity 
Drive American Competitiveness” (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/re-
marks-director-iancu-us-chamber-commerce-event-how-innovation-and. 
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worried about the experts and academics who wanted to push forward with sci-
entific property without minding the details, the experts like Ruffini who might 
say, “Adopt the principle and the difficulties will take care of themselves.”156 
Rogers countered that the patent and copyright laws themselves took hundreds 
of years to develop, and anticipated that to get scientific property right, “it is 
going to take a hundred years or more to do it.”157 It is now just two years shy 
of the hundredth anniversary of Ruffini’s League of Nations proposal, and not 




156. Opposes Royalties on Scientific Ideas, supra note 49. 
157. Id. 
